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ABSTRACT: 
In response to the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, governments in the United States, 
Europe and elsewhere have invested billions of dollars in financial institutions to prevent 
them from going bankrupt and from further disrupting the global economy. Despite 
these massive public bail-outs, a government and "elite" consensus has emerged that 
these nationalized or quasi-nationalized financial institutions should be privatized as 
soon as possible, and that, apart from modest changes in financial regulation, our 
economies should return to the status quo ante financial structure as soon as possible. 
In short, despite a massively disruptive economic crisis caused by financiers, our best 
option as a society is to return to a financial system run by these financiers. We 
disagree. As the crisis reveals, financier dominated finance has a number of crucial 
flaws: it creates major externalities that contribute to financial and real economic 
instability; it promotes short-term investment strategies; it contributes to inequality; and 
it undermines economic efficiency and the achievement of social goals in the real 
economy. We argue that a better strategy for achieving economic recovery, 
restructuring and widely shared, sustainable prosperity is to use public investments in 
the financial sector to build on the successful Post-World War II experiences of publicly 
oriented financial institutions in Europe and the US to create a stronger presence of 
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"finance without financiers". We provide case studies of the positive and negative 
experiences with publicly owned and controlled financial institutions in the United 
States, France, Germany and Italy, and draw lessons for successfully creating more 
publicly oriented financial institutions moving forward. We emphasize local differences, 
policy space and "social  management" of these financial institutions to ensure that 
publicly owned financial institutions is, at the same time, genuinely publicly oriented 
institutions that fit local conditions. 
 
KEYWORDS: financial crisis, financial regulation, social management, financial 
institutions, nationalization. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
The economic crisis of 2007 – 2010 has forced the governments of rich countries to 
invest more public money and play a bigger role in organizing financial institutions and 
markets than at any time since the middle of the 20th century. This marks a major defeat 
for the policy consensus, forged in the 1980's and implemented first by Ronald Reagan 
in the United Sates and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, and then emulated and 
propagated by governments in Europe, by the European Union, the IMF and other 
institutions. This consensus was committed to private ownership of financial institutions 
and "light touch" financial regulation.  
 
While this debacle represents a massive failure in financial regulation the problems with 
the financial sector go deeper than that. For even when things seemed to be going 
smoothly, these financial markets were highly inefficient. They often failed to contribute 
to an efficient allocation of credit, a true reduction of risk in the system, or an efficient 
inter-temporal transfer of wealth (see Epstein, "What Does Finance Do?"). Instead, they 
concentrated wealth and income, led to speculative booms and busts, and facilitated 
massive global financial imbalances, while generating huge incomes for those operating 
in the financial markets (Crotty, 2009b.). 
 
Fearing a repeat of the credit market panic that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers 
Inc., governments in Europe and the United States have invested massive amounts of 
public funds in private financial institutions. At the time of writing, it is unclear how much 
more will need to be invested to stabilize the financial systems of the world’s major 
economies. The U.S. government has undertaken so-called "stress tests" to gain a 
sense of how stable its major financial institutions are after the initial round of public 
interventions. The government has publicly revealed the results of these stress tests, 
suggesting that future investments of public funds are likely to be limited. Even though 
these tests have been widely criticized as being created to be too easy to pass, they still 
imply widespread public ownership and massive subsidies for a number of large banks, 
including Citibank and Bank of America. In Europe, the extent of required continued 
public investment is equally unclear since the European authorities refuse to undertake 
public stress tests. The possibility of continued, large-scale public involvement in 
Europe’s major financial institutions is thus hard to know but is likely to remain 
significant. 
 
Yet, despite the massive failures of the past hands-off public policy approach to 
financial sectors and the subsequent need for public subsidies of struggling financial 
institutions, most governments in the Europe and the United States have chosen to 
return, for the most part, to the status quo ante. This consensus appears to be forming 
among the G-20 governments along the following lines. First, governments should exert 
relatively little formal control over the financial institutions that they have heavily 
invested in. Second, governments should develop an "exit strategy", which effectively 
means they should clean up the balance sheets of these banks and then re-privatize 
them as quickly as possible. Third, financial regulation should be strengthened 
somewhat, so that privately owned financial institutions do not expose the world’s 
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largest economies to the risk of major financial crises. At the same time, though, these 
regulations should not be so strong that they create inefficiencies or stifle "financial 
innovation".  
 
The main reason for the consensus is that the political power of finance, bent but not 
broken by the crisis, is successfully lobbying for its resuscitation and salvation. But, an 
additional important reason for it is a lack of appreciation on the part of policy makers 
and economists of the important role that publicly owned, publicly managed, and/or 
publicly directed financial institutions have played, not just in the distant past or in 
developing countries, but in the rich countries themselves and in the recent past. The 
current mantra is that "governments do not know how to run banks" but the fact of the 
matter is, governments and other stakeholder-driven entities have managed many 
banks for many periods and have often done so very well. These institutions of "finance 
without financiers" have delivered many public benefits in a range of countries over a 
long period of time. 
 
In this paper, we argue that what we need now is a much stronger role once again for 
"finance without financiers". That is, we need publicly oriented financial owners and 
managers to operate a larger share of the financial system in rich countries.  We do not 
need governments to automatically develop "exit strategies" or to entirely re-privatize 
their financial systems. Instead, governments should develop programs to utilize the 
ownership stakes they have in financial institutions and to develop publicly oriented 
banks to better serve the needs of the real economy. These publicly oriented financial 
institutions can take many forms: fully nationalized large banks that engage in the full 
range of banking activities; nationalized banks that serve specific purposes, such as 
making green investments or supporting cooperatively owned business or credit for 
small business owners; or public support for smaller local banks or a network of smaller 
local banks. These new financial models will have to be appropriate to the current state 
of globalization and technology, but the impact of these phenomena on the likely 
success of publicly oriented finance is likely to be less serious than commonly believed. 
As we will discuss in this paper, these changes will actually make "finance without 
financiers" easier and more effective.  
 
Critics will argue, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, that financial institutions 
"without financiers" will not be able to behave any differently than all the other, "less 
publicly oriented" financial institutions. The theoretical argument is that market 
competition will force banks and bankers to conform to its dictates, leading publicly 
oriented banks to engage in the same types of behaviors as the others. For empirical 
evidence, critics will point to the multiple recent examples of public financial institutions 
in the UK, Austria, Italy, France, and elsewhere that ended up making many of the 
same risky investments made by privately owned institutions and, in this and previous 
crises, have been subject to many of the same problems as privately operated financial 
institutions experienced.  
 
As an empirical matter, in the recent crisis, not all financial institutions engaged in the 
same speculative behavior or were equally harmed by the financial crisis. And there 
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have been a number of examples of publicly oriented financial institutions that have 
succeeded in operating differently from private banks.1 Thus, financial institutions do not 
have to behave in a risk seeking way. Still, it is important to recognize that financial 
competition, as well as fads and norms do place enormous pressures on even initially 
publicly oriented institutions to join the herd. It is thus crucial for public policy to create 
structures and incentives to guard against this dynamic and limit the exposure of major 
economies to the kind of financial risks that we are experiencing. 
 
Thus it will be crucial to develop social governance structures to prevent "finance 
without financiers" from becoming "finance FOR financiers". These social governance 
structures will need to have several components, including democratic governance by 
those effected by the financial institutions' actions, strong financial regulation over-all to 
prevent massive gaps in practices between publicly oriented financial firms and the 
market, and compensation and/or tax schemes which reduce the benefits in the system 
for destructive financial practices. Where possible, these social governance structures 
should build on existing local practices and institutional structures, where possible, 
rather than being invented whole cloth or imported wholesale from abroad. 
 
Unfortunately, there are significant political obstacles to building on these local 
structures and practices, especially in Europe. The extremely neo-liberal European 
Union Financial Market Directive has placed great pressure on countries trying to 
dismantle publicly oriented financial institutions, arguing that these lead to unfair 
competition, or amount to "financial protectionism". Individual countries can and do 
resist these pressures, but still, for 'finance without financiers" to succeed in the 
European context, more "policy space" has to be created to allow countries to develop 
these institutions. 
 
In what follows we attempt to address these issues primarily by using a "case study" 
approach. We will present examples drawn primarily from European and U.S. 
experiences that show how publicly oriented financial institutions have succeeded and 
failed. We draw lessons from these historical experiences for ways to use the public's 
investments in financial institutions to promote better financial performance. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly sets out what the 
functions that financial markets should perform, contrasting this list with the role actually 
played by current financial practice. Section III presents case studies of "finance without 
financiers" first by giving a broad overview of European, U.S. and Japanese experience 
following the Second World War and then presenting more detailed studies of the 
United States, France, Germany and Italy. Building on these case studies, section IV 
suggests some models for transforming current public investments in financial firms into 
publicly oriented financial institutions. The final section (V) concludes. 
 
                                                 
1
 Gilian Tett, for example, describes in detail some of the safeguards that JP Morgan took relative to many other 
banks during the bubble, despite enormous pressure on it do to otherwise (Tett, 2009). 
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1. WHAT SHOULD FINANCE DO? 
 
Standard mainstream analysis posits that financial markets serve a number of essential 
functions in capitalist economies; they: 1) intermediate between savers and borrowers 
2) mobilize savings 3) allocate credit to their most profitable and productive uses 4) 
engage in maturity transformation 5) provide liquidity 6) facilitate inter-temporal 
allocation of consumption and wealth 7) reduce risk. (Mishkin, 2008) 
 
The recent financial crisis, as well as the poor social performance of liberalized financial 
markets over the last several decades, has shown that liberalized financial markets do 
not conform to mainstream financial theory.  The poor performance of mainstream 
financial theory and neo-liberal financial practices compel a search for more adequate 
theoretical foundations for understanding what finance should do. Schumpeterian 
analyses emphasize the role of finance in mobilizing savings for productivity enhancing 
investment, including for the creative destruction that accompanies economic growth.  
Other economists have emphasized, instead, the destructive aspects of finance, raising 
questions about how socially creative wild-cat finance really is. Marx described the 
financial fraud and deceit that reached dizzying heights during speculative booms and 
busts; Keynes brilliantly showed how finance often enrich the rentier's at the expense of 
productive investment and can undermine the overall stability of the financial system 
itself; Minsky, Crotty and Kindleberger detailed domestic and international endogenous 
cycles of boom and bust that only strong government controls could tame. (Crotty, 
2008; Patnory, 2003; Tett, 2009). These raise questions about negative externalities 
created when financial institutions and regulators fail to take into account the negative 
impacts their decisions can have on other financial institutions and the real economy. 
Behavioral financial theorists question the 'rationality' of financial actors. And critics of 
many stripes have derided the short-term orientation that financial markets impose on 
the economy, through imposition of shareholder value imperatives, and short term 
trading strategies in derivatives markets, for example. 
 
Another prominent stream of economic thought has emphasized the key role of the 
state in managing finance to increase the creative and reduce its destructive aspects. 
This literature emphasizes the public role in underwriting, guiding and utilizing finance 
for private and public purposes. Gerschenkron showed the importance of the state in 
mobilizing finance, especially in "Late Developers". Zysman, Amsden, and Eichengreen,  
emphasized specifically the role of the state in helping to structure and mobilize finance 
for development and economic restructuring, when economic restructuring was a state 
goal, for example, after the Second World War in Europe, Japan and the United States. 
 
Drawing inspiration from this strong historical and theoretical literature, we argue in the 
case studies below,  that systems with appropriate structures of "finance without 
financiers" are more likely to promote social goals such as widely shared prosperity, 
Gerschenkronian development, Schumpeterian dynamism and Minskying stability, than 
are financial systems based primarily on neo-liberal principles, dominated by financiers. 
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2. EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES WITH "FINANCE 
WITHOUT FINANCIERS". 
 
2.1 Introduction2. 
 
It is well known that after the disasters of the Great Depression and the second World 
War, governments in the UK, Europe, Japan and even the United States asserted much 
greater control over central banks and the financial industries than they had had in the 
previous period. (Capie, et. al., 1999). Ministries of planning and finance, as well as 
central banks were extensively involved in credit allocation mechanisms for economic 
restructuring and economic growth. Central banks utilized a variety of credit allocation 
techniques to accomplish these goals, and in most cases, these techniques were 
supported by capital and exchange controls on international capital movements. 
Ministries of Finance and Treasury Departments played major roles, along with central 
banks, in directing credit and organizing financial institutions to serve public purposes.  
In addition, many financial institutions were nationalized in whole or in part, and their 
managers were directed by governments to address social needs. Hence, through strict 
regulations, credit allocation techniques and/or through public ownership and control, 
"finance without financiers" became widespread in the "advanced" countries, following 
the great depression and the Second World War. 
 
Analysis by Lester Thurow and the U.S. House Banking Committee in the early 1970’s 
identified three main techniques for protecting or promoting priority sectors commonly 
used during this period: (1) asset based reserve requirements (2) government 
borrowing in the capital market and re-lending to preferred sectors and (3) competition 
by government financial institutions for primary saving flows and lending captured flows 
to preferred sectors (for example, through the government postal savings system). In 
the case of Sweden, asset based reserve requirements were used to aid the housing 
market. (ibid.)  In Japan, government savings institutions were used to capture personal 
savings flows and these were channeled by the finance ministry (of which the Bank of 
Japan is a part) to industries that were perceived to most preserve economic growth. 
(ibid., p. 13; see also Zysman, 1983; Pollin, 1995 and Grabel 2000, U.S. Senate, 1981.). 
 
The U.S. government created a myriad of public and quasi-public financial institutions, 
moreover, that supported national goals, notably housing. (Dymski, 1993; Wolfson, 
1993).  In Europe and England, central banks that had been independent before the war  
found themselves subject to state ownership and control after 1945 (Capie, et. al., p 
72). During the War, monetary policy was often implemented through direct controls 
while interest rates were held low and constant. Direct controls continued in the 
aftermath of the war with various credit allocation techniques. (Capie, et. al., 1999, p. 
25.)  
 
Prominently used during this period were credit controls. These are measures by which 
the authorities seek to modify the pattern and incidence of cost and availability of credit 
from what markets would generate on their own (Hodgman, 1972, p. 137). Credit 
                                                 
2
 This section draws on Epstein (2006). 
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controls seek to influence credit allocation and interest rate structures. (ibid.). In Europe 
credit controls served a number of purposes: (1) to finance government debt at lower 
interest rates (2) to reduce the flow of credit to the private sector without raising 
domestic interest rates (3) to influence the allocation of real resources to priority uses 
and (4) to block channels of financial intermediation and thus to assist restrictive 
general monetary policy and (5) to strengthen popular acceptance of wage-price 
controls by holding down interest income. (Hodgman, ibid.). 
 
European experiences with credit controls varied from country to country. In Germany, 
controls were used only briefly after the Second World War. In the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, extensive use was made of them, but they were always seen as 
temporary and short-run expedients. In the Netherlands, credit controls were used to 
support macroeconomic policy, rather than credit allocation. In the United Kingdom, the 
principle aim of controls was to facilitate low cost government debt. The government 
was concerned about the impacts of high interest rates on the bond market, on income 
distribution and on the balance of payments. A more limited aim of the quantitative 
ceilings was to guarantee a flow of short term credit at favorable interest rates to high 
priority activities such as ship building and the finance of exports and productive 
investment in manufacturing. Credit ceilings were put into place, and exemptions were 
sometimes made for priority sectors (Hodgman, 1972, p. 144). Moreover, the Bank of 
England identified sectors for which credit should be limited, such as consumption and 
the financing of imports. Some empirical work indicated that the controls were effective 
(ibid; p. 145). In England, as elsewhere, these credit controls were accompanied by 
exchange and capital controls. On the other hand, France, Italy and Belgium were a 
different story. There, the principle of controlling credit flows and interest rates to serve 
national interests was widely accepted. Italy and Belgium also used similar policies. In 
the case of Italy, a major goal was to help develop the Southern part of the country. 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 1972, p. 11, and the discussion below). The general 
consensus of analyses of these experiences is that they are most successful when the 
controls apply to a broad swath of the financial sector, to avoid arbitrage and avoidance, 
when they are accompanied by capital and exchange controls, to avoid capital flight, 
and when they are part of a coherent plan of economic promotion and development 
(Zysman, 1983; Hodgman, 1972; U.S. Senate, 1972; U.S. House of Representatives, 
1981). 
 
In addition to using credit controls, here there was also increasing and extensive state 
regulation, ownership and control over financial institutions (see Zysman, 1983 and the 
discussion below). In addition, there is a great deal of historical precedent for the 
positive roles of public banks to achieve public goals. Alice Amsden (2001) details the 
key role of public development banks in helping successful developing countries such 
as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and others achieve rapid economic growth in the 
second half of the 20th century.  
 
2.1.1 Individual Case Studies. 
 
To delve more deeply into experiences with "finance without financiers" we present four 
country case studies of post-World War II experiences: The United States, France, 
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Germany and Italy. In each of these case studies, we try to address some of the 
following questions: 
 
1. What did these "publicly" owned, controlled, or coordinated financial institutions do? 
2. What were their goals. 
3. How were they governed: for example, what were their incentive structures, 
management structures, over-sight by government, governing principles, etc.? 
4.  Why did they break down or change – internal problems? State failure? Corruption? 
Change in external environment that they could not/did not adapt to? Change in 
external governance regime (i.e., the rise of neo-liberalism and privatization, or what? 
5. Are these (or aspects of these) models for us now? 
6.  How would they have to be modified to work in the contemporary environment?  
 
2.2 The USA: The Successes and Failures of Fannie Mae. 
 
2.2.1 Introduction. 
 
During the 1930's, the US government implemented major innovations in government 
involvement in finance. President Hoover and then Roosevelt created a number of 
institutions, including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which was initially used 
to re-capitalize banks and other firms, and then to finance war procurement during the 
Second World War, and housing finance institutions, to prevent foreclosures and 
provide liquidity to housing finance markets. (Knodell, 1994; Todd, 1992; Butkiewicz, 
2002). 
 
The RFC, which was closed down in 1953, largely because of political opposition of 
Republicans who opposed government financial interference in the markets and 
opposition by private financial institutions who feared competition from the RFC. Though 
ultimately tainted by scandals, the RFC is widely thought to have played important roles 
in rescuing private financial institutions, and helping allocate credit to achieve important 
social goals, particularly during World War II. As we see below, though the housing 
finance institutions also started off in promising fashion, and initially achieved important 
social goals, they were pushed into becoming hybrid institutions – partially private and 
partially public – which led to their perversion and ultimate collapse. 
 
2.2.2 Housing Finance in the 1930s: Introduction. 
 
During the 1930's, as now, home foreclosures were a major causality of the financial 
and economic crisis.  In 1931, only 254,000 non-farm housing units were built, 
compared with an annual average of over 700,000 during the 1920's, while between 
1926 and 1931, the percentage of non-farm mortgages in foreclosure had almost tripled 
(Moss and Bolton, 2009, p. 2). In 1932 President Hoover recommended the creation of 
the Federal Home Loan Bank System,  a network of 12 regional banks to lend up to $2 
billion to private banks and "thrifts" specializing in home lending. Although the bill 
eventually passed and helped reduce bank failures it was never effectively implemented 
to stabilize homeownership. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office, one of his first 
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initiatives was to establish a government agency that could refinance individual 
mortgages, rather than supporting the home ownership indirectly through the private 
banks. He established the Homeowners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) which was 
capitalized by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), another depression era 
government institution charged with "financing agriculture, commerce and industry". 
(Moss and Bolton, 2009, p. 3).  HOLC was authorized to finance its activities by issuing 
government guaranteed bonds that were exempt from taxation at all levels of 
government and was given a 3 year term to refinance the mortgages of "borrowers who 
were faced with the loss of their homes through foreclosure or tax sales". Typically, the 
HOLC would buy the mortgages from private banks at a discount, and pay for the 
mortgages with the tax-free bonds it issued. Then HOLC would retire the mortgage, 
consolidate the homeowner’s related debts into a new 15 year mortgage at a lower 
interest rate. Hence, participating homeowners, "not only saw their mortgage-related 
debts wiped clean and reorganized into a single low interest amortized loan, but also 
benefited from the appraisal process that reduced the principal they owed." (ibid, pp. 3 – 
4). Local communities also benefited because through HOLC, delinquent property taxes 
were paid and allowed homeowners to make necessary improvements on their homes. 
"In so doing, the HOLC helped to ensure local government solvency and the 
maintenance of neighborhood property values." (Ibid., p. 4). 
 
In addition, the Federal Government provided seed money to start a network of privately 
run "thrift" institutions in areas not served by such institutions. The U.S. Treasury, in 
fact, became the single largest shareholder in many of these banks. Some of these 
were located in metropolitan areas as well, which made local privately owned banks 
angry with the government competition.  
 
In 1934, the government passed the National Housing Act. Among other things, this act 
established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). "The FHA would play a leading 
role in the modernization and standardization of mortgages, thus helping to 
revolutionize the American housing industry." (ibid., p. 5). The FHA significantly 
strengthened the secondary market for mortgages across the country by guaranteeing 
the mortgage but also by holding all of the parties to a minimum set of standards. Still, 
more was needed to restore the housing industry. In 1938, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA) which came to be known as Fannie Mae, was created.  It 
started with an initial capital of $10 million from the RFC, its supervising agency. Its 
mission was to buy FHA mortgages from loan originators. For the next 16 years, the 
U.S. Treasury, via Congressional authorization, financed Fannie Mae's operations. (ibid, 
p. 6). It was not authorized to make direct mortgages, but by making "advances or 
precommitments on mortgages" it came very close. Its work was expanded with the GI 
Bill in 1944, which created Veteran Administration loans (VA loans) for soldiers 
returning from World War II. The VA insured a portion of the loans, and by 1949, Fannie 
Mae began purchasing these mortgages as well.  
 
A housing boom followed the War and by the 1950's, as inflation and interest rates rose, 
more and more banks wanted to sell loans to Fannie Mae so that they could get 
reserves to sell higher interest rate mortgages. Fannie Mae had to get larger and larger 
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allocations from the Treasury to finance this activity. The government and congress got 
concerned that this government financed role was becoming unsustainable. (ibid., p. 7).  
This lead to a big debate on what to do with Fannie Mae: banks and thrift institutions 
wanted it to be privatized; consumer groups, and construction companies wanted it to 
stay as is. 
 
In a fateful decision, Congress reached a compromise, passing the Federal National 
Mortgage Association Charter Act in 1954. Fannie Mae was established as a "public-
private hybrid whose secondary mortgage market operations were set up to become 
decreasingly dependent on federal funding." (ibid., p. 7). A goal was established of 
eventually completely privatizing the institution. "In addition to charging fees for its 
services, Fannie Mae was also authorized by the Charter Act to issue bonds and 
notes…these debt securities had to be approved by the Treasury" and limits were 
placed on the amount of debt it could issue. Moreover, Fannie Mae was "granted stand-
by authority to borrow from the Treasury". (ibid., p. 8) 
 
Beyond funding issues, Fannie Mae was directed under the Charter Act of 1954 to 
focus on three areas: Its secondary mortgage market activities through which it bought 
FHA and VA loans; provide loans to "segments of the national population" that were 
unable to obtain such loans on their own" and third to manage their portfolio of 
previously granted loans. 
 
This new status created a number of problems. One of the most important was how was 
Fannie Mae going to reconcile its public and private objectives: on the one hand "to 
support the government's efforts in the housing field" with its private incentives to 
operate "on a profit making, self-sustaining basis"...(ibid, p. 8). These problems were 
about to become worse, as plans for privatization were greatly accelerated by President 
Lyndon Johnson and the Democrats in the late 1960s. Johnson, greatly concerned 
about the budget deficits associated with fighting the Vietnam War and to a much lesser 
extent, the so-called "Great Society Programs", was facing pressure to put "on budget" 
the operations of Fannie Mae in the secondary housing markets. (ibid., p. 8). Rather 
than risk jeopardizing these other priorities, he chose to formally privatize Fannie Mae. 
The government decided to spin off the other two functions of Fannie Mae into a new 
organization the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) that came to be 
known as "Ginnie Mae" and placed it in the government in the "Housing for Urban 
Development", HUD. HUD retained relatively broad supervisory authority over Fannie 
Mae. According to the law, the HUD could still require Fannie Mae to take secondary 
mortgage actions to further 'the national goal of providing adequate housing for low and 
moderate income families", though, as the legislation made clear, HUD would also 
recognize the need for Fannie Mae to pursue a "reasonable economic return". (ibid., p. 
9). Additionally, Fannie Mae could not issue any securities without HUD authorization 
and HUD could limit the dividends that Fannie Mae paid to stockholders. HUD could 
also examine Fannie Mae's books and could force it to file reports to HUD. Finally, the 
President of the United was authorized to nominate – and the Senate to confirm – five 
of Fannie Mae's board members. In addition, the President was granted the additional 
authority to remove any of the fifteen board members for "good cause". (ibid., p. 9). 
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Fannie Mae retained its ability to borrow from the Treasury up to 2.25 billion and, 
moreover, was authorized to issue debt securities without having to register them with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. And in 1970, Fannie Mae was authorized to 
purchase conventional home mortgages, in addition to FHA and VA mortgages. 
 
Importantly, the 1968 legislation also authorized Ginnie Mae to insure mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) constructed on the basis of portfolio of FHA and VA mortgages. 
Technically, Ginnie Mae did not issue any securities, it just insured them. Because 
these securities were guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, which was an entirely government-
controlled agency, their "full and timely" payment was explicitly guaranteed by the 
Federal Government. These securities were known as "pass-throughs" because they 
simply passed through the principal and interest payments made by a pool of Ginnie 
Mae mortgage holders – prepayments included – through to Ginnie Mae security 
holders." (ibid., p. 10).  Starting in 1974, Ginnie Mae was allowed to purchase 
conventional mortgages, but it could still only insure pass throughs backed by FHA, VA 
or Farmers Home Administration mortgages. 
 
The 1970 legislation also established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) to "foster a national "secondary market for conventional residential 
mortgages". (ibid., p. 11), a program that Savings and Loan associations had lobbied for  
many years. Freddie Mac was set up as mixed public-private corporation and so did not 
have to pay any taxes aside from those on its real estate holdings. Freddie Mac issued 
its first pass-throughs in 1971. Freddie Mac guaranteed the "full and timely payment of 
interest and the ultimate payment of principle" on these securities. However, because 
the FHLMC, like the FNMA was only a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) and not 
a full-fledged government agency, the promise did NOT carry the explicit backing of the 
federal government. (ibid., p. 11).   
 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued more and more "pass-through' securities. They 
became very popular with investors. The timely payment of interest and principle was 
guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, even though they, in turn, DID NOT carry 
the explicit backing from the Federal Government (ibid., p. 12). 
 
These mortgage backed securities enjoyed tremendous growth during the 1970s and 
1980s. Pension funds and mutual funds were particularly interested in them. Despite the 
absence of explicit government guarantee, there was a general belief among market 
participants which – in the 1980's and 2008 turned out to be true – that these securities 
enjoyed an implicit government guarantee. Consequently, these GSE pass-throughs, 
like GSE bonds, were generally priced by the market "as if they were triple A rated 
securities or government agency issues". (ibid., p. 12). 
 
2.2.3 Regulation of the GSE's. 
 
As the government sponsored agencies multiplied and their public-private hybrid 
natures became more complex, their regulatory structure became more complex and 
fragmented. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) among others 
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repeatedly raised concerns about its regulatory structure. (GAO, 2008). "The current 
housing GSE regulatory structure is fragmented and not well equipped to oversee their 
financial soundness or hosing mission achievement. The Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) is responsible for safe and soundness oversight of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac while the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) is 
responsible for safety and soundness and mission oversight of the FHLBank System. 
Both regulators lack key statutory authorities to fulfill their safety and soundness 
responsibilities as compared to the authorities available to federal bank regulators. For 
example, OFHEO and FHFB are not authorized to limit the asset growth of housing 
GSEs if capital falls below predetermined levels. Moreover, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) which has housing mission oversight responsibility for 
Fannie Mae and Feddie Mac…may not have sufficient resources and technical 
expertise to review sophisticated financial products and issues." (GAO, executive 
summary). The GAO and others have concluded that, "Creating a single housing GSE 
regulator could better ensure consistency of regulation amount the GSEs." But this was 
not done until the GSE's became insolvent and had to be put in receivership by the US 
government in September, 2008, at the cost of billions of dollars to U.S. taxpayers.  
 
2.2.4 The Impact of the GSE's: From Promoting Housing to  Socializing Risks and  
Privatizing Benefits. 
 
In its initial stages, the GSE's and related public housing finance institutions 
successfully promoted the development of housing in the United States, and these 
benefits spread widely at through the middle and working classes of the U.S., if not to 
the poor. But as more and more of the system was privatized, and as the regulatory 
structure of the housing GSEs became more fragmented and lax, this hybrid structure of 
private ownership with government privileges, especially the implicit debt guarantees,  
and ineffective oversight that appeared to give public approval of its behavior, turned 
out to be a lethal combination. It not only lead to an ultimate massive failure leading to 
large losses for the public, but it undermined the public mission of the GSEs to promote 
sustainable housing options among the underserved. And, thought the GSEs were not 
primarily responsible for the sub-prime crisis over-all, they did play a role. This is 
particularly problematic considering that they had been at least partially tasked with 
promoting a real and sustainable solution to the US's housing problems.   
 
2.2.5 Costs and Benefits of  the Housing GSEs. 
 
Most of the literature has studied the implicit government subsidies granted to the 
housing GSE's, primarily from the implicit government guarantee of the GSE's debts, 
and, to a less extent, other benefits such as exemptions from some taxes and fees. The 
most cited studies by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Federal Reserve 
economist Wayne Passmore suggest these subsidies have been quite substantial. 
Figures 1 and 2 below show two estimates of annual subsidies. Figure 2 estimates are 
larger because they assume that the mortgages in the portfolio are renewed in the 
longer term. 
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Thus, by 2003, the government subsidy was estimated to be somewhere between 20 
and 45 billion dollars per year. (CBO, 2003). 
 
Who benefited from this subsidy? Most evidence suggests that by the 1990's, when the 
GSEs were under relatively little regulatory scrutiny, the majority of the benefits accrued 
to the managers and owners of the GSEs themselves, and not to the home buyers or 
even to the banks that sold the mortgages to the GSEs.  
 
The Congressional Budget Office in 1996 estimated that in 1995 Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac retained more than 42% of the subsidy granted to them by the United 
States Government, while passing through the remainder to homeowners and banks. In 
a later study, Passmore estimated that shareholders, including managers of Fannie 
Mae and Feddie Mac who have significant stock holdings and options, retained 53 
percent of the value of the subsidy, which in total he estimated to be 122 billion to 182 
billion dollars in added value. This amounts to about $79 billion dollars (Passmore, 
2005). 
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Given the substantial benefits that the GSEs received from their relationship with the 
government, it is understandable that this left lots of room for corruption and political 
scandals. 
 
2.2.6 Political Role and Corruption. 
 
There have been many corruption scandals at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, scandals 
that stem from its hybrid relationship with the government and with its massive 
privileges that it wants to protect. As Jack Shafer wrote in Slate, the online journal: The 
key to Fannie Mae's survival was the patronage system it ran". (Shafer, 2008). "For 
years, high level jobs at Fannie Mae were lucrative prizes for lawyers, bankers and 
political operatives waiting for their next U.S. government post". (ibid.). These posts 
were exploited by some of the top executives. At the top of the list was Franklin D. 
Raines, chairman and chief executive officer at Fannie Mae from 1998 – 2004. He was 
forced to leave Fannie Mae in 2004 when regulators discovered  it had broken 
accounting rules "in an effort to conceal fluctuations in profit and hadn't maintained 
adequate risk controls". The New York Times reported that regulators "have said that of 
the $90 million paid to Mr. Rains from 1998 – 2003 at least 52 million was tied to bonus 
targets that were reached by manipulating accounting". (ibid.) 
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Robert Zoellick, current head of the World Bank was an officer at Fannie Mae twice, the 
second time, between 1993 and 1997 when, according to the American Banker he 
“used his close ties to Republicans in Congress, such as Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich, Republican from Georgia, to defend Fannie Mae from new taxes.” (Slate, 
2008). 
 
There is a very long list of influential Republicans and Democrats who worked to protect 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from more regulation and who profited handsomely from 
doing so. These influential lobbyists were sometimes joined by advocates of affordable 
housing and other advocates of the poor, who believed that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were helping their constituents. Sometimes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would 
win their favor by making donations to their organizations, a small amount relatively 
speaking for them but a very large amount for these groups. As Paul Gigot, a strong 
critic of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac put it: “Fannie has been able to purchase political 
immunity for decades by disguising its vast profit-making machine in the cloak of 
“affordable housing”. (Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2008.) Of course, this was only one 
component of its strategy: it also spent millions in lobbying and hired vast numbers of 
influential republicans and democrats to attack anyone who tried to limit its prerogatives. 
 
2.2.7 Role in Sub-Prime Crisis. 
 
After the crisis that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers in October 2008 and during 
the U.S. presidential campaign in 2008, the Republicans claimed that the main cause of 
the financial crisis was the role played by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in buying and 
packaging sub-prime mortgages. This, they claimed, stemmed from the well meaning 
but wrong headed government goal of creating the American dream of housing for all 
Americans. In essence, they claim, the financial crisis was not an example of market 
failure, but government failure. This claim is still be repeated by Republicans and right 
wing economists as they try to write the narrative of the economic crisis. 
 
Is there truth to what they are saying? Well, first of all, if it were true that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac played a major role, this would still not be a matter of government 
failure. For as we have seen, these were not government institutions. They were 
essentially private institutions reaping enormous private benefits, but using certain 
government privileges, notably the implict government guarantee of their debt and lack 
of key financial regulation, to make enormously risky bets. In this, they were not terribly 
different from many of the other financial institutions implicated in the crisis. 
 
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
indirectly involved in some of the abuses of the sub-prime crisis, they came into it rather 
late, and so played a contributing role, not a lead role. (Krugman, 2008; Calculated 
Risk, 2008; personal communication with Dean Baker, June 11, 2009). Krugman argues 
that “Fannie and Freddie had nothing to do with the explosion of high-risk lending a few 
years ago, an explosion that dwarfed the Savings and Loan fiasco. In fact, Fannie and 
Freddie, after growing rapidly in the 1990’s, largely faded from the scene during the 
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height of the housing bubble”. (Krugman, 2008). This was partly because of constraints 
that the regulators had put on the GSEs after the accounting scandals. 
 
They did come back into the market toward the end of the bubble to try to regain market 
share. But they could not purchase, insure or underwrite the sub-prime loans because 
their charter forbid them to do it. Regulators and regulations prevented Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac from engaging in the worst of the abuses. In fact, the very definition of a 
sub-prime loan is a loan that does not meet Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac standards. As 
Lewis Ranieri, the legendary promoter of mortgage backed securities (MBS) made 
famous by Michael Lewis in Liar’s Poker, put it in a speech before financial regulators at 
the height of the sub-prime bubble, according to Muolo and Padilla:” at least when 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dominated the mortgage business ‘they played the role of 
gatekeeper’; the…GSEs had loan underwriting standards – things like minimum down 
payments…and mortgage insurance that covered potential losses. ‘Those standards 
have been pushed aside”. ..now, he said, ‘The rating agencies are playing the role of 
quasi-regulator’. (Muolo and Padilla, 2008, pp. 216-217. 
 
Still, as one analyst put it, “Fannie and Freddie had about as much o do with the 
“explosion of high-risk lending” as they could get away with. We are all fortunate that 
they couldn’t get with all that much of it.” But it is true that they did not like losing market 
share and chafed under the constraints that had been imposed on them. So they 
pushed the envelope as far as they could within their charter. They got involved in many 
“near sub-prime loans.” (Calculated Risk, 2008). And in the earlier years, they were very 
important in supporting the mega-housing lenders that were eventually implicated in the 
crisis, for example Angelo Mozilo, the owner of Countrywide which was one of the 
largest sub-prime lenders.  As Muollo and Padilla tell the story about the 1990’s, “Over 
the next 15 years Countrywide and Fannie Mae – Mozilo and Johnson and then Mozilo 
and Franklin Raines, Johnson’s successor – would be linked at the hip. Johnson invited 
Mozilo to attend and speak at retreats for Fannie Mae’s top executives and sales team. 
The Fannie Mae chief, in turn, frequently flew on the Countrywide Corporate jet…As 
Countrywide’s loan originations soared into the stratosphere, so did Fannie Mae’s on-
balance-sheet assets.” (Muolo and Padilla, 2008, p. 113.) 
 
In the, one can agree with those who argue that “we can give Fannie and Freddie their 
due share of responsibility for the mess we’re in, while acknowledging that they were 
nowhere near the biggest culprits in the recent credit bubble. They may finance most of 
the home loans in America, but most of the home loans in America aren’t the 
problem.”(Calculated Risk, July 14, 2008). 
 
2.2.8 Lessons to Be Learned for Finance without Financiers.. 
 
Most observers agree that before the GSEs were partially privatized, they played an 
important role in providing liquidity to the housing market and helped provide a massive 
pool of housing for working class and middle class Americans. To the extent that this 
was a social goal of the United States, it was served reasonably well. They were never 
Gerald Epstein, Dominique Plihon, Adriano Giannola and Christian Weller. Finance without 
financiers. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 140-178 
157 
pushed very hard to provide housing for the poorest Americans and they did not 
facilitate that goal to any great extent. 
 
The problem was when the GSEs were partially privatized. This created enormous, 
perverse incentives for it to act to maximize private wealth at the public’s expense and 
to utilize its wealth to build a political machine that maintained its position.  
 
There was nothing inevitable about this evolution. The government could have retained 
the GSEs as proper government agencies, without creating these perverse incentives. 
But to do so would have required the government to properly account for the costs and 
risks associated with doing so, and placing these on the Central Budget. This it was 
unwilling to do. As a result, it took the ultimately risky strategy of maintaining a 
contingent liability for the debts of the GSEs, without at the same time instituting 
adequate controls. 
 
What options does the government have moving forward? These have now been fully 
nationalized, at least temporarily, and placed under a uniform regulator. The 
government should use this opportunity to develop a structure to clarify the important 
social roles of the GSEs, keep those roles public, under strong regulations and 
management, and then privatize the other roles without any government guarantees, 
explicit or implicit. That means that the institutions cannot become too big to fail. 
Otherwise, the US tax payer will once again be liable to socialize the costs of very 
considerable private benefits. 
 
2.3 France. 
 
2.3.1 The French banking system under tight State control (1936-1986). 
 
As was the case in all the "advanced" economies, the 1930s crisis led the French 
government to strengthen the institutional framework and increasing the State's role in 
financial and macroeconomic governance. These early post-war reforms were then 
extended during the period of the Socialist Government in the early 1980's, when the 
role of the state in financial ownership, control and regulation was expanded 
considerably. After the mid-1980's, however, the state's role in finance was rapidly 
reduced with extensive financial de-regulation and privatization. 
 
The Act of June 13 1941 created a centralized governance institution, the Conseil 
National du Crédit. It also introduced a distinction between deposit banks, investment 
banks, medium and long-term credit banks, and financial institutions. This 
compartmentalization of banking activities was based on the time horizon of 
transactions, which meant that deposit banks were only allowed to engage in short-term 
operations, as opposed to medium and long term credit banks who could conduct 
longer term transactions. The purpose of this principle was to control lending and to 
regulate money creation and the allocation of savings.   
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After World War II, the nationalization of the Banque de France and the four leading 
deposit banks (Crédit Lyonnais, Société Générale, Banque Nationale pour le 
Commerce et l’Industrie, and Comptoir National d’Escompte) gave the government a 
prominent role in France’s banking sector.  Later, the Act of February 11 1982 which 
was instituted by the newly elected left wing government led by François Mitterrand 
nationalized thirty-six deposit taking banks. At that stage, virtually all banks were owned 
by the State.  
 
Besides ownership of banks, the French public authorities instituted a financial 
regulatory framework that placed strict controls over financial activities. Three groups of 
regulatory instruments are worth mentioning. First, most interest rates were 
administered according to the major goals of the government’s economic policy. Thanks 
to this policy, bank lending  with low (below market level) interest rates was expanded to 
strategic sectors such as farmers, small business, social housing. Second, banks had to 
comply with rules aiming at controlling their activity. Ceilings were imposed by the 
Central bank on bank lending with a view to regulating money creation and to curb 
inflation. In addition, during the decade following WW II, banks had to comply with floors 
with respect to their portfolio of public bonds. This measure was used as a way to 
channel savings towards the financing of public investment. Third, the French 
authorities imposed until 1989 a strict control on banks’ international operations and on 
their transactions on the forex market.  
 
In general,  France had, perhaps, among the most extensive and successful sets of 
credit allocation controls of all the western countries. These controls, were part of the 
government’s overall approach to industrial policy. When the Bank of France was 
nationalized in 1945, it was placed under the National Credit Council, the institution in 
charge of implementing the financial aspects of the government plan. (Hodgman, p. 
147; Zysman, 1983). The broad aim of credit policy in France was to contribute to the 
modernization of the French economy and its ability to compete in international markets. 
To influence the volume and allocation of credit, the Bank of France used various 
methods (see Hodgman, 1972, p. 148 and Zysman, 1983, for descriptions). Among the 
tools of credit allocation were widely used were asset based reserve requirements. With 
these requirements, Banks had to observe minimum reserve requirements with lower 
rates on privileged assets. “These asset reserve requirements had the dual purpose of 
adding to bank portfolio demand for the specified assets and of preventing the banks 
from using these eligible assets for rediscounting at the central bank.” (Hodgman, 1972, 
p. 148.) A second technique – ceilings on credit extension – were also been used. The 
ceilings were used to reduce credit expansion without raising interest rates, and also to 
allocate credit because priority sectors were exempted from the ceilings.  These 
included short-term export credits, medium-term loans for construction, and others. 
These ceilings applied to a large range of financial institutions, and were accompanied, 
as well, by capital and exchange controls as an important concomitant. (Hodgman, 
1972. pp. 148-149;  Zysman, 1987). A third tool was the scrutiny of individual credits 
made by banks. This allowed the Bank of France to approve loans for privileged 
purposes and restrict loans for other uses. Another approach to affecting the allocation 
of credit involved the use of rediscounting of bills for priority purposes (ibid., p. 151). 
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These various measures were intended to affect primarily short-term and medium credit 
flows. Other tools at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance and other institutions were 
designed more to affect the medium and long-term flow of credit. (ibid;, p. 149). 
 
Zysman (1987) has emphasized the role of these credit allocation techniques in helping 
to revive the French economy and help it adjust to structural challenges in the post war 
period. This role has been facilitated by the existence in France of a bank based 
financial system, unlike the capital market based systems in the U.S. and U.K., which, 
according to Zysman, make such credit allocation mechanisms more difficult to 
implement (see also Pollin, 1995 and Grabel, 2000). Italy and Belgium also used similar 
policies. In the case of Italy, as we will see below, a major goal was to help develop the 
Southern part of the country. (U.S. House of Representatives, 1972, p. 11).  
 
2.3.2 The reshaping of the French banking system by liberalization policies. 
 
With the banking Act of 1984, a new framework that was imposed on all “credit 
institutions”, represented the first stage in the liberalization of the French banking 
system. This act abolished the legal distinctions among the different types of banks 
mentioned above with a view towards creating “universal banking”. Following this, 
successive French governments – both leftwing and rightwing - implemented a major 
liberalization of French financial markets. All economic institutions were allowed to issue 
money market instruments after 1985. Most administered interest rates, as well as 
credit ceilings and the control of international operations, were abolished.  
 
It is important to note that the role of the European Commission, a radical neoliberal 
institution, has been decisive in this liberalization process in all European countries. The 
transposition into French law of the European directive of June 24 1988 on the free 
movement of capital eliminated lending restrictions and currency controls and removed 
many of the administrative barriers that had compartmentalized credit institutions 
business in European countries. This directive also broke down many of the institutions 
of "finance without financiers" in the other European countries discussed later, 
especially Germany. 
 
These liberalization policies had a major impact on the banking system in France. They 
gave rise to disintermediation in lending and alignment of bank lending rates with those 
of the capital and money markets more generally. As a result, differential interest rates 
could not be used for credit allocation purposes. In addition, capital market-based 
financing has increased dramatically while bank-based financing is declining. The 
financial intermediation ratio, which measures the proportion of total lending to non-
financial agents from resident financial intermediaries, fell from 71% in 1971 to 41% in 
2001 according to the Banque de France.  
During this time, the banking sector underwent a spectacular process of concentration. 
State ownership and family ownership have nearly disappeared. The number of credit 
institutions shrank by half, from 2001 in 1990 to 974 in 2005. The proportion of bank 
assets held by the top twenty institutions rose from 65.1% in 1988 to 78.4% in 2002. 
The top ten banking groups control more than 85% of the total retail banking business in 
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France. BNP-Paribas has become the sixth largest European bank in terms of market 
capitalization and the largest bank in the euro area (Commission Bancaire). 
 
2.3.3 Lessons to be learned from the French experience. 
 
The role of the State has been very important in the French economy in the past, and 
still is today under different forms. This “Colbertist” tradition is criticized by the neoliberal 
view because State involvement is considered on a priori grounds to be an obstacle to 
economic growth. This view, however, stands in contradiction with existing evidence. 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, it has been shown that government intervention has 
played a decisive and positive role in the French economy before the great switch 
towards financial liberalization in the early 1980s. Government involvement contributed 
to the so-called post-war miracle, not only in France, but in all major European countries 
(Eichengreen, 2006). Economists from the French “Ecole de la régulation” have shown 
that banking systems under government control were strategic institutions of the so-
called Fordist capitalist regimes during the postwar period and contributed in a decisive 
manner to the “Trente glorieuses” (1945 – 1975), i.e. the three decades of 
reconstruction and rapid growth in the aftermath of WW II (Boyer, 2004). 
 
In France, the State controlled banking system has been an efficient instrument for the 
governments in two respects. First, it allowed producers in all sectors to acquire 
external funds to increase their investment outlays at a low cost beyond the level 
permitted by sole reliance on internally generated profits. Second, at the 
macroeconomic level, credit control by the Banque de France has been an efficient tool 
to restrain monetary creation and inflation. To put it simply, the French banking system 
was managed to achieve goals corresponding to the interest of the productive sector, 
taking into account macroeconomic constraints. 
 
But, as in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as with other cases 
discussed below, a central weakness of the Post-War French banking system was its 
"governance structure". In the case of France, the State control of high level bank 
managers was not tight enough. The “Crédit Lyonnais” scandal in the mid 1980s 
illustrates this problem. Chairman Jean-Claude Haberer took excessive risks which 
caused huge losses (100 billions of francs).  
 
One explanation of this scandal is the connivance of the State bourgeoisie elites in 
France. In France, the leaders and managers of the state mostly attended the same 
University, the Ecole Nationale d'Administrative (ENA), an elite training ground, that 
tends to create a common ideology and connections of loyalty, among its members. In 
the early post – war period, this was greatly influenced by the anti-Nazi resistance 
bonds and helped create the ethic of public purpose ethic that promoted "finance 
without financiers". With the rise of neo-liberalism, however, these same bonds and 
connections were transformed into a common goals of implementing privatization and 
neo-liberalism, and facilitating a market framework for individual profit and 
advancement. This promoted the ethic of "finance FOR THE financiers". This ethic of 
Gerald Epstein, Dominique Plihon, Adriano Giannola and Christian Weller. Finance without 
financiers. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 140-178 
161 
loyality and personal gain contributed to the financial corruption that brought down 
Credit Layonnaise.  
 
Partly as a result of this change in ethic and creed, and as the recent financial crisis 
shows, the governance structures of privately owned and operated financial firms can 
be a disastrous failure as well, and can also cost tax payers billions of dollars. Still, if 
one wants to revive a system of more publicly oriented financial system, it is necessary 
to ameliorate if not solve these serious governance problems. We further address these 
issues below. 
 
Indeed, despite of the just mentioned problems with the breakdown of French financial 
governance, one can easily see that todays’ neoliberal banking systems in France, as 
well as in all advanced capitalist countries, appears to be worst on almost all grounds 
than the situation which prevailed during the “Fordist era” during the Second World War. 
Let us take three major criteria – i.e., growth, banking stability and banking governance 
- to compare these two historical periods. It is well established now that the State 
controlled banking system contributed to the rapid rate of growth in the “Trente 
glorieuses” decades. Conversely, there is a presumption that commercial banks have 
become procyclical under the influence of market pressure (including prudential 
regulation). This means that market-based banking systems do not contribute to steady 
growth as they used to in the Fordist regime. If we look at the governance of banks, the 
on going financial crisis provides strong evidence that today's liberalized banking 
system is a complete failure. Greedy bank managers and traders completely escaped 
from the control of shareholders and banking authorities, causing huge financial and 
social damage. The French experience shows clearly that, according to major criteria, 
the performance of State controlled banks has been much more efficient that the 
performance of market-based banks run by financiers. 
 
2.4 Italy: State and market in Italian Banking. 
 
In the past century (from the 1930s up to the beginning of the 1990s) the Italian banking 
industry has been substantially managed by the State or by local public bodies. But 
after 1990 (thanks to the so called Amato – law), in few years time the whole banking 
sector was “privatized”. The “privatization” took place in parallel with an equally fast 
process of concentration, inspired if not directly managed by the Central Bank (Banca d’ 
Italia). The target was to promote a system of large private banks in the form of limited 
companies. In addition, while the activity of the traditional commercial bank was 
constrained to provide mainly short term commercial credit to firms, in the 1990s Italian 
banks have been allowed to operate as “universal”  as well as “mixed” banks.  
 
Prior to "privatization in 1990, The Italian banking system consisted of  a variety of 
institutions that were dominated (almost 80% of the activity) by the role of the “public” 
sector.  
 
Supporting the “public nature”  of the banks, is the Italian Constitution where Article 47  
states that the mission of banking is to preserve and protect national savings. Only in 
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1980 did the High Court (Corte di Cassazione) concede that banking activity could be 
considered similar to business activity. Since the early 1930's through the end of the 
1970's, public ownership of the banks was also considered  as necessary to protect 
“efficiency standards” and  was likewise seen as  necessary to guarantee the 
"neutrality" of the allocation of credit. 
 
The main category of public banks, now completely disappeared, was the Istituti di 
Credito di Diritto Pubblico (ICDP, Public Law Credit Institutes) which included the Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro (established in 1926 and completely owned by the Ministry of 
Treasury) and the four most ancient Italian Banks (existing since the end of the XV 
century); Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia, Istituto San Paolo di Torino, Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena) whose top management was appointed by the Treasury. Although they 
were not “State Banks” they were managed by the State and by representatives of local 
institutional bodies. 
 
Banche di Interesse Nazionale (BIN): Banca Commerciale Italiana; Credito Italiano; 
Banco di Roma. Limited Companies with a “private” origin which had the State as their 
main shareholder (banche a partecipazione statale, for this reason they are considered 
“public”). 
 
While the ICDP were born as non – profit organizations, the BIN were for- profit 
organizations, saved in the early 1930's by State intervention. They belong to the 
system of the Partecipazioni Statali, an original formula, largely applied in Italy to Banks 
and to industrial firms, under the control of IRI (the Institute for the Industrial 
Reconstruction that had been active until a few years ago).  
 
Local authorities and institutions (like Universities, Chambers od Commerce, 
professional associations, etc.) were in charge of the 89 Casse di Risparmio (non profit 
organizations born to help local development, to support small business, and to promote 
and protect local savings). The Casse di Risparmio shared with the system of Banche 
Popolari (BP) and Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCC, cooperative banks) the 
mutualistic approach to banking. This part of the banking system (and the wise 
management of currency devaluation) have been the financial “core” behind the most 
celebrated experience of the Italian Industrial Districts. 
 
While the privatization process has been applied to the ICDP and to the Casse di 
Risparmio (all transformed into limited companies), it has not been able to dissolve the 
cooperative form and mutualistic principles that still prevails in the BP and BCC system. 
In 1995 the share of  the “public” in total banking assets had been reduced to around 
60% and by 1999, to less than 10%.  
 
Now, after almost twenty years of experience, the “privatization” process provides some 
interesting lessons. From 1993 on, there is an overall decline of the cost and profit 
efficiency of the Italian banks. The decline affects especially the “new” large banks 
operating as limited companies, an agent that played the main role in the concentration 
and consolidation process. By contrast, a much less disappointing performance has 
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been realized by banks that share the so called mutualistic nature (BCC and POP). This 
is true in general and in the regional dimension as well.  
 
Moreover, there are still strong elements of "public banking" even with respect to Italy's 
"privatized banks". As far as the present financial concerned is concerned, it is clear 
that the large limited companies sector represents the critical point of the Italian banking 
system, and it is also quite evident that the essential safe guard for a “stable” 
governance of these large groups is represented by the very peculiar nature of their 
main shareholder: the network of the so called Banking Foundations “resuscitated” in 
1990 by the Amato law. In its turn, the central role of the Banking Foundations raises 
the interesting question of how  “private and on the market” the main Italian Banking 
Groups really are.  
 
“Modern” banking began in Tuscany and in the vice-reign of Naples at the end of the 
Fifteenth Century. The Neapolitan case is particularly interesting because it is the only 
one where it is possible to follow banking evolution from a documental point of view. 
A peculiarity shared by all these banks is the original nature of their founders, 
specifically philanthropic institutions, whose mission included aid to particularly weak 
social classes (orphans, abandoned children, prisoners, unmarried mothers), and 
sanitary assistance (like hospital institutes), while granting particularly accessible forms 
of credit to the poorest people (the system of loan on pledge of the Monti della Pietà is a 
typical example).  
 
Through the door of philanthropy, the world of credit was drastically open and reformed. 
The authorizations granted in the course of time by the Spanish Viceroyalty to the 
Neapolitan Philanthropic Institutes so that they could extend their activities to fields 
usually controlled by the “money lenders” quickly made them dominant on the market. 
In this area the institutes quickly defeated the competition by using a code of conduct 
that – according to the nature of these activities – would neither allow them to practice 
usury nor consider customers as a mere object of speculation. This is an important 
example of how an efficient not-for-profit policy can beat the profit logic, typical of the 
private management of the credit relationship.  
 
The phenomenon of the Neapolitan Public Banks is very interesting because they were 
established as out-and-out banks, a direct emanation (even if in a different form) of the 
original philanthropic institutes that became their owners. The philanthropic institutes 
then became the “shareholders” of the respective banks and benefited from the 
incomes deriving from the bank activities that were statutorily allotted to the realization 
of the philanthropic mission of the controlling institutes. Most important, these 
institutions were able to introduce (with the “Fedi di credito” and “poilizze”) a system of 
fiduciary circulation well before the “invention” of the Bank of England.   
 
It is now evident that after more than four centuries, in 1990 the Italian lawmakers 
reviewed the evolution of this model and applied it to the Public Law Credit Institute 
(ICDP) and to the Savings Banks for reinstating the distinction between the conferring 
body (Foundations/Philanthropic Institutes) and the underwriting bodies (Commercial 
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Banks) even though this was not their intent. Forcing the analogy, it could be said that 
the scheme of the Neapolitan Public Banks, not only was restored in 1990, but it is 
nowadays a dominate model, as the three important bank groups (Intesa-San Paolo, 
Unicredito, Monte Paschi) are strictly controlled by a solid network of Banking 
Foundations.  It is important then, to understand that the mission of commercial banks 
in Italy may be seen to be rooted in social commitment and philanthropy and that this 
feature represented the main factor of their success on the market. 
  
What can we learn today from this ancient story? Certainly, credit appears now - in 
terms of instruments and organization - a very different business, but what is quite 
modern an/or instructive is the “governance” side of that experience.  Still, a closer look 
reveals that the most interesting feature of the modern Banking Foundations, is their 
manyfold double sided nature that takes them in between the “public” and the “private”.  
In Italy they have been labeled “public” until 1998 and then “private” afterwards by virtue 
of the concession of the power of producing their own Statutes. They are still supervised 
by the Ministry of Trasyury, but their Governance comes from the convergent decision 
of several  statutary stakeholders representing the interests of their communities.  
 
2.5 Germany. 
 
Germany has a long standing history of public involvement in its banking sector. Three 
particular institutions deserve mention here. They are the Sparkassen (savings banks), 
postal savings institutions, and the German development bank called the Kreditanstalt 
fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW), or Bank for Reconstruction. These institutions comprise a 
substantial share of the German financial system and they perform a wide range of 
financial services with a particular focus on personal wealth building and small business 
financing.  
 
2.5.1 Sparkassen. 
 
The German banking system rests on three pillars: public banks, private banks, and 
cooperative banks. Of the public banks, savings banks (Sparkassen) constitute the 
largest sub-sector. Germany’s first Sparkasse was founded in Hamburg in 1778. 
(DSGV, 2009a) This and other early Sparkassen aimed to educate Germans on 
savings, build wealth for low-income families, and promote local economic development 
(DGSV, 2009a). 
 
Even today, Sparkassen remain committed to public welfare and are owned by 
municipalities. Their services are open to all German citizens regardless of their 
individual income or assets (DGSV, 2008, p. 28). About 35 million people have one or 
more accounts with a Sparkasse or one of their umbrella organizations, the so-called 
Landesbanken.DSGV, 2008, p. 42). Today there are 446 Sparkassen with about 16,000 
branches and offices employing approximately 261,000 staff.(DGSV,2009b)  
 
The Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband (German Savings Bank Association, 
DSGV) serves as the umbrella organization of the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe and its 
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438 savings banks, 11 Landesbanken, 11 Landesbausparkassen, 12 public insurance 
companies and many additional financial service providers. The DSGV is a decision-
making body and represents the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe’s interests regarding 
banking policy, regulatory law, and other banking industry issues on both national and 
international levels. (DGSV, 2009c) The savings banks provide a full range of services – 
either directly or through Landesbanken – for personal, corporate, particular small and 
medium sized enterprises municipal and institutional customers. 
 
Their operations, though, are guided by three principles. First, they are regional, i.e. 
they only serve clients in their geographic area, typically the boundaries of their 
municipality. Second, they are owned by municipality (city, town, or county). Third, they 
are not publicly held. (DSGV, 2009a). The savings banks pursue a business policy 
described as “Fair. Human. Close at hand.” That is, they are profit-oriented but not 
exclusively profit-maximizing. (DSGV, 2008 p. 23) 
 
The Landesbanken play a crucial role for the operations of Sparkassen since they can 
offer additional financial services, from which Sparkassen are prohibited. The members 
of Landesbanken include Sparkassen and their and their owners, municipalities. 
Independent Sparkassen can be voluntary members. Whereas the Sparkassen are 
controlled locally, the Landesbanken are controlled by the state governments. 
Moreover, Landesbanken can engage in a range of banking services, such as regional, 
national and international loans, as well as certain brokerage services, which 
Sparkassen cannot offer.  
 
In 2007, the year of the most recent annual report available, the Sparkassen-
Finanzgruppe was the market leader in multiple segments. It had a 35.4% market share 
of business volume in the German banking industry, a 38.1% share of deposits, and 
38.6% share of loans, including 36.5% of construction financing (DSGV, 2008).  
 
A March 2009 press release from the DSGV announced that Germany’s 438 savings 
banks experienced a profit of 1 billion euros in 2008. Heinrich Haasis, President of the 
DSGV, credits the savings banks as being a stabilizing fixture of the German economy, 
with customers’ confidence in savings banks increasing during this financial crisis.  
Haasis also noted that none of the savings banks’ 251,400 has been laid off due to the 
financial crisis. With that many employees, savings banks represent the largest 
commercial employer in Germany. (DSGV, 2009d) 
 
According to another March 2009 press release, during the last fiscal year, savings 
banks enjoyed their highest growth rate since 2001, increasing their balance sheet total 
by 2.5% to 1.1 billion euros.  In 2008, savings banks also saw customer credit increase 
by 13.9 billion euros (to 631.4 billion euros) and customer deposits increase by 24.8 
million euros (to 742.3 billion euros). (DSGV, 2009e)  
 
The role of public institutions, though, has not gone unchallenged. In particular, other 
EU member countries have challenged the implicit government subsidy for Sparkassen 
that arises from the public ownership and guarantee of the Sparkassen in Germany. In 
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2005, based on a compromise negotiated with the EU Commission in 2001 to be 
compliant with the State aid rules of the EC treaty, the guarantee obligation for the new 
liabilities of the Sparkassen and Landesbanken was discontinued and the maintenance 
obligation was replaced. (LBBW, 2002; DSGV, 2009a)   
 
2.5.2 Postal savings institutions 
 
Another part of the German public financial service sector included the postal savings 
banks. These institutions traditionally offered limited banking services, particularly 
checking accounts and savings accounts, to their customers. In 1985, though, Germany 
established a government commission to explore privatization and liberalization of the 
German Post. The Post was divided into three sectors in 1989: postal service (Deutsche 
Post), postal banking (Postbank), and telecommunications (Deutsche Telekom). 
Additional reform in 1995 changed these three parts into public companies. In 1999, 
Deutsche Post purchased 100% of Postbank’s shares from its sole shareholder, the 
federal government. In June 2004, Postbank went public. Deutsche Post remained the 
majority shareholder until it sold its shares to Deutsche Bank AG in September 2008. 
The agreement was modified in January 2009 to grant Deutsche Bank AG an initial 
22.9% acquirement of Deutsche Postbank AG during the share exchange (Deutsche 
Postbank, 2009, p. 15) The current shareholder structure thus is: 39.5% Deutsche Post, 
25% + 1 share Deutsche Bank AG, 23.7% institutional investors, and 11.8% retail 
investors. (ibid., p. 16)  
 
2.5.3 Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau 
 
The primary German development bank is the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW).  
Shareholders include the Federal Republic of Germany (80%) and German federal 
states (20%).DSGV, 2009a; LBBW, 2002) KfW performs domestic economic and social 
tasks and services on behalf of the government and serves as an advisor to the 
government.(KfW, 2008, p 3) For instance, KfW launched the “Housing, Environment, 
Growth” initiative in 2006 and it finances investment and advisory services in less 
industrialized economies.(ibid., p. 9) 
 
2.5.4 The economic impact of publicly oriented financial institutions 
 
A number of studies have documented the potentially positive impact of publicly 
oriented financial institutions on economic growth and stability. German public savings 
banks, for instance, have been a long running positive contributed to economic growth 
since the 1950s (Grunbacher, 2001; Hakenes, Schmidt, and Xie, 2009). Faster 
economic growth also tends to result in a stronger, positive response from publicly 
supported financial institutions and smaller banks than from their counterparts, 
suggesting a pro-cyclical reinforcing mechanism between publicly oriented financial 
institutions and economic growth (Schertler, Buch, and von Westernhagen, 2006). 
These economic growth contributions from publicly oriented financial institutions 
primarily originate from their focus on lending to small and medium-sized enterprises 
and on start-up businesses (Harm, 1992; Hakenes, Schmidt, and Xie, 2009; Schertler, 
Gerald Epstein, Dominique Plihon, Adriano Giannola and Christian Weller. Finance without 
financiers. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 140-178 
167 
Buch, and von Westernhagen, 2006). In particular, these are areas, where publicly 
supported financial institutions can improve the efficiency of the economy by eliminating 
credit market inefficiencies (Buch and Doepke, 2008). Importantly, these effects of 
publicly supported financial institutions do not seem to depend on the size of the 
publicly oriented institution (Bloch, 2008).  
 
2.5.5  The Current Crisis 
 
Several of the Landebanks were caught up in the recent financial crisis. Their exposure 
was partly due to the fact that they were large financial institutions, and partly due to 
having made some of the same mistakes as other financial institutions: buying toxic 
ABS, investing in risky real estate to make up previous losses in  eastern Germany, or 
by simply trying to expand too rapidly. The financial problems of these banks have 
created a strong political backlash and calls for reform. From our point of view, the 
lesson is that public financial involvement requires stricter regulatory oversight; 
otherwise there will be a tendency to use public money to privatize gains while 
socializing losses. 
 
2.5.6  EU Pressures 
 
As described earlier, there is an attempt by the European Commission (EC) to reign in 
the public financial institutions in Germany. But that the German government still 
remains committed to the cooperative banks and the savings banks and is waging a 
battle with the EU to protect these public institutions, while agreeing to make reforms. It 
is likely that the German government will win in this instance. The publicly supported 
banks, especially the savings banks are very popular and they enjoy tremendous 
support.  On the other hand, the EC has no clear constituency for its position, other than 
maybe Citibank, Barclay's and a few other large UK and US banks with a retail 
emphasis who are fighting for "equal access" to the German retail market.  
 
Another political constituency supporting the local public financial institutions is local 
governments. Germany is a federal state, unlike France. The savings banks are a 
source of power, positions, and money for local and state governments. These 
politicians will defend the savings banks because it is in their interest. That puts local 
politicians against an increasingly unpopular European bureaucracy. Cooperative banks 
are, to some extent, the rural counterpart to the savings banks and therefore similar 
arguments apply. The KfW is crucial for large scale export products and for housing 
finance. Again, both have strong constituencies in Germany. So, for the time being, the 
locale constituencies in Germany are winning the battle to retain local policy space for 
"finance without financiers".  
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3. FINANCE WITHOUT FINANCIERS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS. 
 
3.1  Approaches to Finance without Financiers 
 
As is clear from the preceding, there are many possible mechanisms and forms to 
enhance the social orientation of finance that have been adopted and, have been 
generally successful. As is also clear, in most developed countries these practices have 
been significantly scaled back and transformed, but, for the most part, they have NOT 
been entirely abandoned. Moreover, the emergency actions of many countries have 
now invested billions of dollars of funds in the financial sectors of these countries and 
these investments give renewed opportunities for more social guidance and control over 
financial activity. 
 
In this section we outline several possible forms of finance without financiers. Clearly, 
the particular form(s) that should be adopted will vary from country to country. We will 
start from the premise that a large bank has been "nationalized" in whole or in part. The 
question is: what should be done with it next. 
 
Here we briefly discuss four approaches to longer term social ownership and control: 1) 
Full public ownership and control of the bank 2) Part public and part private ownership 
of general purpose bank 3) Separate off one or more special purpose banks from the 
nationalized bank 4) re-privatizing the bank but run it as a public utility in which its 
activities are highly restricted, but it, in turn will have a moderate but fairly stable rate of 
return. 
 
3.1.1 Full Public Ownership and Control of the General Purpose Bank 
 
Some have argued that all of the insolvent or nearly insolvent banks should be fully 
nationalized and maintained as public banks, (Moseley, 2009). Moseley, for example, 
argues that these banks should be run "according to public policy objectives (affordable 
housing, green energy, etc), rather than with the objective of private profit 
maximization." In addition to providing financing for important social objectives, the 
permanent nationalization would, according to Moseley, have other advantages as well. 
In the short run, it could help the economy recover by increasing lending to households 
and businesses, where as now, banks are just hoarding cash. In addition, it would 
improve the equity of the financial rescue plans. Says Moseley, unlike the "current 
bailout policies" it would "not involve a massive transfer of wealth from taxpayers to 
bondholders" and stockowners. 
 
In the longer run, according to Moseley, nationalized banks would be "freed from the 
need to maximize short-term profit" and therefore would avoid toxic assets and 
promoting financial asset bubbles, those actions that have lead to the current crisis. 
"Instead, the deposits of these megabanks would be invested in decent affordable 
housing to all. With housing more affordable, mortgages would be more affordable and 
less risky". 
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Moseley's claims that bank nationalization would stabilize the over-all economy is based 
on his assumption that many large banks would be nationalized. But, in fact, that seems 
very unlikely and so, instead, it seems to make more sense to think of bank 
nationalization as affecting a few large banks and then relying on macro-prudential 
regulations and other factors to help stabilize the overall economy. 
 
From that perspective then, the main arguments for longer term bank nationalization are 
two: 1) their usefulness for helping to achieve important public economic goals and 2) 
equity (and fairness) concerns: making sure that the taxpayers get benefits from their 
investments in these banks and these benefits are distributed more equitably than bank 
incomes and profits. 
 
Here we will focus on the first since the second is more or less well known and even self 
evident. 
 
3.1.2 Role of Public Banks in Achieving Public Goals 
 
Public banks can play a very important role in this context. They can be large and multi-
purpose, they can be smaller and more decentralized, or they can be small and 
networked to achieve economies of scale in terms of support, insurance, and risk 
pooling. 
 
3.1.3 Role of a Large Public Bank in the Current Period 
 
In the current context, there are both short term and long-term goals that could be well 
served by socially oriented banks. In the short term, such banks could provide lending 
to businesses and provincial (or  state and local governments) that are trying to 
maintain employment and services and expand production. Nationalized bank will be 
more oriented to provide these kinds of loans rather than sitting on excessive reserves 
or paying out dividends to stockholders trying to keep the private capital cushion high 
enough to prevent nationalization, or paying excessive salaries and bonuses to top 
executives and "rain makers" who will not be needed in the national banks because 
these kinds of high stake trading activities are very unlikely to occur.  
 
In this longer term, these same priorities would be more central to the operations of the 
"nationalized bank" than a typical privately owned institution. That is, the nationalized 
bank would place more evidence on lending to businesses, governments and 
households engaging in real investment and employment generation, rather than 
investing in proprietary trading, speculation and mergers and acquisitions. 
 
In the medium to long term, the bank could develop expertise in those areas of great 
need for the European and US economies. All of these economies have major longer-
term structural needs, including making a transition to climate-safe economies. 
 
The nationalized banks can: 
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1. Specialize in funding for "green initiatives", both small and large. These can include, 
lending to 1) Business with new technology ideas, serving some of the role of venture 
capitalists but not requiring such a massively high rate of return and hurdle rate as they 
do 2) smaller business loans directed at projects such as home and building 
refurbishing, that can help green the economy (Pollin, et. al,  2009) 3) Underwriting 
government bonds issued for important social goals such as green technology, 
education funding, mass transportation. Having a large player in the public bond arena 
that can compete with and try to keep more "honest" the other players in this market 
would be of great use to municipal, state and provincial governments 4) In the US (and 
some European countries?)  student loans can be underwritten—as economies must 
retool for the green future and other future challenges. In the US, for example, playing a 
role in education loan business to once reduce the corrupt and monopoly practices 
could help  reduce excessive fees and loan costs. 5) Public banks, if they have enough 
market power, can help enforce standards in the financial market place in those areas 
where demanders of bank services will prefer these higher quality services. In other 
words, a large bank that enters the marketplace enforcing higher standards can help 
promote a dynamic of a "race to the top" in the provision of high quality banking 
services. 
 
There are activities that the public banks will be prohibited from engaging in. The 
rampant deal making in toxic assets; proprietary trading and exotic financial engineering 
unrelated to public purposes. 
 
Where will the bank get the assets to engage in these actions: they will get it from 
depositors and other capital providers. The public bank will be seen as extremely safe, 
with a government guaranty provided to depositors and other providers of long term 
credit, but the rates of return paid will not be as high as possibly available in other 
financial markets and institutions. This  can be sustainable, however, only if there is 
strong monitoring of the investment portfolio of the bank to make sure that they 
investments are relatively low risk or achieve important social goals for which there are 
high social rates or return. In the latter case, the direct subsidy cost of the government 
on the activity has to be accounted for and appropriated by congress and the fiscal 
authorities. This way, the bank may be able to take some significant risks to achieve 
social objectives, but these have to be transparent and paid for transparently by the 
congress and fiscal authority. Budgets for such activities must be appropriately 
considered through the normal appropriations process. 
 
Thus, these public banks can advertise to depositors that by investing in these banks, 
they are truly investing in America and that their investments are safe. Combined with 
the broad deposit network this should provide a large amount of credit funds available to 
invest in the real economy. 
 
3.1.4 Selling off the Irrelevant Parts of the Banks 
 
Presumably, a significant part of the nationalized bank will not be relevant to the new 
public entity. These are sections which have engaged in the kinds of financial 
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engineering, trading,  and speculative activities that the new public bank will not be 
engaging in. These parts of the bank should be sold off and the profits should be used 
to defer the costs to the public of the takeover. 
 
3.1.5 Model 2: Smaller more Specialized Public Banks 
 
A second approach would be to carve out a smaller bank with one or more specialized 
goals. For example, the government could create the "Green Bank of America" or that 
would specialize in lending to private businesses and governments for green activities. 
Other examples would be the "European Education Bank", and/or "The European 
Infrastructure Bank" which would focus on underwriting (possibly in public private 
partnerships) the creation of more infrastructure, particularly those meeting social goals 
such as green transportation. In this case, the government would then divide the "good 
bank" into two or more parts and retain those that would specialize in these actions and 
sell off those that would be privatized .The public bank would want to retain the 
depositor base in order to fund these more specialized, activities. 
 
 Another example would be the "Co-op Bank of Europe", where the bank would 
fund worker's, or farmer's or community cooperatives or other cooperative businesses, 
including co-operative banks. To be sure, a larger bank could have these different 
specializations as separate departments within them. 
 
3.1.6 Model 3. Public Utility Model 
 
Another model is to turn the nationalized banks into a public utilities, perhaps with joint 
public/private ownership. This is an approach similar to that that was common in the 
United States in the early Post-World War II period. This would be a return to what Paul 
Krugman has called "boring banking". Banks would fund basic investments as they did 
in the 1950's -1980's in the areas of basic corporate loans, housing, business, state and 
local governments. They would have to hold a high level of capital and have a 
significant liquidity cushion. In exchange, they would have strong government 
guarantees on deposits and other long term borrowing which would enable them to 
attract deposits and credit at competitive rates. Thus, public utility banks would have 
relatively stable earnings and modest rates of returns. They could attract capital from 
pension funds and other investors wanting this risk and return profile.  
 
The major differences between the public utility model and the nationalized model is 
that: 
 
1. The  bank would not be subject to close day to day management of their operations 
in which they were expected to satisfy specialized public goals. Of course, the broad 
restrictions imposed on these banks would force to act broadly in a consistent manner 
with public goals.  
2. Their profits would only accrue to the public as a portion of the government's share of 
the capital of the bank.  
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As a model, the public utility model might be more acceptable in the U.S.  than a fully 
nationalized bank would be. And avoiding issues of social versus private rates of return 
might make this bank somewhat easier to operate, as it would then just have to subject 
itself to a market test. Its major disadvantage is that it would not be as useful as a tool 
for achieving specialized social goals as would a public bank as described above. 
 
3.1.7 Governance, Financial Regulation and Policy Space 
 
Social Governance: Oversight, Incentives and Management 
 
One lesson we can draw from our case studies is that there is crucial need for strong 
"social governance" if publicly owned financial institutions are to remain effective agents 
of the public. In other words, just because institutions are publicly owned, does not 
mean they will be publicly oriented. 
 
We define “social governance” as the institutional arrangements which structure the 
management of public banks under social control. The key to effective social 
governance is to have democratic management systems that effectuate not just 
transparency, but accountability to a broad array of stakeholders. This is in contrast to 
the "shareholder value" notion that requires the firm to be accountable to shareholders 
only. Social governance requires that the firm be accountable to stakeholders including 
workers connected with the firm, community members that are affected by the firm's 
actions, and where relevant, other institutions, like state and local governments, which 
may be strongly impacted by the firm's actions. Of course, if the bank is publicly owned, 
then the public owners must also be appropriately represented. 
 
Social governance may take various forms in different countries since the past history 
and the institutional framework is different from one country to the other (path 
dependency). But the most effective approaches are likely to involve "checks and 
balances" to ensure that a wide range of important stakeholders have voice. 
 
To implement such social governance, it not only makes sense to pay careful attention 
to local institutions and customs, but it may be sensible to build on currently existing 
institutions. For instance, in Germany the co-determination system which involves both 
managers and labor unions in the decision process, could provide a useful point of 
departure for the building of social governance. In France, the “Comité d’entreprise  
which brings together managers and unions for decisions on social matters, can be 
used to become the major institution of social governance. 
 
In the U.S. public banks should have a board of directors which are "hands-on" 
directors, consisting of government officials from Treasury and other relevant 
government institutions. for If, for example, the bank's charter is to serve as a "green 
bank", then, perhaps, the Energy Department as well as stakeholder representatives, 
such as labor, small business, state and local government, as well as specialists with 
expertise in green transformation would have management oversight.  
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3.1.8 Compensation Policies 
 
Pay scales both inside the public financial institution, as well as for other financial firms, 
will have an important impact on the success of "finance without financiers". The pay of 
bank staff and executives must be high enough to attract excellent talent, (so cannot be 
on the normal governmental scale, presumably) but at the same time would be no 
where as high as has been made by Wall Street rainmakers and CEO's in the roaring 
90's and '00's. The goal, presumably, would be to attract excellent, experienced and 
skilled people who nonetheless have a strong public orientation. There may need to be 
limits on financial pay in private sector firms –perhaps through taxation policy  -   in 
order to prevent the gap between the public employees and private ones from becoming 
so large that they undermine the public orientation of the managers of public firms. 
 
3.1.9 Creating Policy Space in Europe 
 
As discussed earlier, reviving "finance without financiers" may require extensive 
differences in local practice, and even a significant amount of local experimentation. In a 
federal System like the US, such differences and experimentation have a long history 
and a good deal of space. But in Europe, the EC financial directives to "level the playing 
field" for financial competition, might significantly limit the opportunities for such 
differences and experimentation. To create the necessary policy space, the EC 
members should explicitly carve out finance from competition policies since finance 
constitutes  has special characteristics that could justify such a "carve out". Most 
importantly, finance constitutes a strategic asset, much like education and health care, 
and, as we have seen, can cause enormous problems unless it is regulated carefully 
according to local needs and customs. 
 
3.1.10 The Importance of Strong Financial Regulation 
 
For any of these schemes to work, there has to be strong financial regulation overall. 
Crotty and Epstein (2009) describe a set of regulations that would make the overall 
financial system more stable, more efficient and more equitable in the United States. 
TUAC, 2008, among others, has developed a set of proposals for Europe. These and 
similar proposals would reduce the massive and perverse compensation schemes that 
now pervade the financial system, and would make more difficult the more abusive 
financial practices that have contributed to this crisis. This is important in general, but 
also for the success of these models of public banking. 
 
First of all, without appropriate financial regulation, our financial systems would 
inevitably lead to more booms, crashes, and overall instability. All financial institutions – 
these public ones included – have difficulties operating in such an environment. This 
boom and bust cycle could place enormous strains on the incomes and even solvency 
of the public banks. 
 
Second, without strict and successful regulations, the attraction of very high short run 
rates of return and extremely high salaries and bonuses in the private financial sector 
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could pervert the public purposes of public banks, by eroding the efficacy of monitoring 
and regulation, by pulling away expertise and management skill, by making it more 
difficult to attract capital during financial bubbles and by eroding the confidence of 
regulators in the necessity and usefulness of the public banks. 
 
Third, strict financial regulations would help the public banks make the transition from 
insolvent private banks to successful public ones. The public bank would be able to 
attract good talent because, among other reasons, these bankers would realize that 
they cannot do enormously better in the private sector; the kinds of investment skills 
learned in the public bank will also be useful in the private banks and vice versa, making 
it easier to find skilled bankers who are more willing to adopt to the culture of public 
banking. Over time and more generally, there would be more likely to be self-reinforcing 
dynamics between as the divergence between returns and actions of public and private 
banks would be less than would occur in the absence of strict regulation and the return 
of "wildcat" finance. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
The current financial system has failed, and in fact, has not been operating well for 
many decades now. It is time to restructure financial regulation and financial institutions 
so that they better address the considerable challenges facing our economies. Better 
financial regulation will be necessary but it will be far from sufficient to accomplish these 
goals. A variety of ways must be found to make it more likely  that financial markets and 
institutions serve social purposes. As we have argued here, there are a variety of 
historical and currently existing models of "finance without financiers" that we can draw 
upon to help us strengthen the social productivity and efficiency of finance. Of course, 
these will have to be tailored to local, national and even regional norms and goals. Now 
is the time to broaden and strengthen these institutions where they exist and to create 
new ones where they do not. The current crisis and significant public investments in 
private finance focuses the public’s attention on these issues now, and delaying 
measures to address these issues will risk condemning our economies to more decades 
of unstable, inefficient and inequitable finance. 
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